My primary area of research is ethics, where I focus on two topics. The first topic is the special authority that morality is thought to have over us; the second topic is society’s treatment of non-human lives. I also dabble in feminist aesthetics.
Publications
"Nonnaturalism and the Ineffability of Moral Normativity", Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming)
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnaturalist’s notion of normativity is illusory, I argue that a more benign explanation is available that fits well with the general tenor of nonnaturalism and that explains a number of puzzling observations about the state of the metaethical debate. This explanation is that morality’s normativity is ineffable. I also argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, my strategy for redeeming the nonnaturalist does not commit her to the quietist view that nothing sensible can be said about moral normativity. While the ineffability of moral normativity precludes an informative literal characterization, there remains the possibility of using metaphors to communicate usefully about moral normativity.
"The Inefficacy Objection and New Ethical Veganism" Journal of Social Philosophy (2023, online first)
Traditionally, both proponents and detractors have understood ethical veganism as the position that veganism is obligatory and that eating meat is wrong. One of the most forceful objections recently raised against ethical veganism is the inefficacy objection, which says that no individual’s choice to be vegan can be expected to impact the meat industry. I argue that, in light of the inefficacy objection and subsequent responses, we should take seriously a more modest brand of ethical veganism, which I call “new ethical veganism.” New ethical veganism is non-committal as to whether being vegan is obligatory but maintains that, either way, it is morally good. I offer four theoretical interpretations of the claim that it is good to be vegan and argue that some of the most prominent responses to the inefficacy objection lend themselves better to a defense of new ethical veganism than traditional ethical veganism.
"The Paradox of Rape in Horror Movies" British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2022): 671-86 (download self-archived version)
In this paper, I identify and provide an explanation for a heretofore unrecognized puzzle in feminist aesthetics and the philosophy of horror. Many horror movie fans have an aversion to rape scenes. This is puzzling because genre fans are not equally bothered by the depiction of other types of violence and cruelty. I argue that we can make sense of this selective aversion by appeal to the notion of “distance,” which philosophers of horror use to explain why people are attracted to horror movies in the first place. When we consume horror, we “distance” ourselves from the scary things depicted, which allows other mechanisms to kick in that lead to overall enjoyment. I argue that “distance” often collapses when viewers are confronted with depictions of rape because rape is common in real life and a gendered form of violence that is implicated in social injustice.
"Species Egalitarianism and Respect for Nature: Of Mice and Carrots" in Oliver Sensen and Richard Dean (eds.), Respect: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press (2021)
I urge a reconsideration of the implications of species egalitarianism, which is an essential element of the position in environmental ethics that Paul Taylor calls “respect for nature.” Species egalitarianism’s claim that every living thing has equal inherent worth appears to lead to counterintuitive conclusions, such as that killing a human being is no worse than killing a dandelion. Species egalitarians have generally responded by explaining that species egalitarianism is compatible with recognizing moral differences between killing different types of living things, and that some killing is morally permissible. I raise doubts about whether this deflationary defensive strategy is philosophically justified, and suggests that taking seriously the supposedly repugnant implications of species egalitarianism may have a salutary effect on the overall debate.
"Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2020): 431-55 (download self-archived version)
Here is a prima facie plausible view: since the metaethical error theory says that all positive moral claims are false, it makes no sense for error theorists to engage in normative ethics. After all, normative ethics tries to identify what is right or wrong (and why), but the error theory implies that nothing is ever right or wrong. One way for error theorists to push back is to argue for “concept preservationism,” that is, the view that even though our ordinary moral discourse is deeply flawed, we should nevertheless continue to engage in moral thought and talk. However, in this article, I pursue a different strategy. I argue that even if we completely abandon moral discourse, thus endorsing “concept abolitionism,” the discipline of normative ethics survives. While traditional normative ethics uses as its “starting points” moral claims and beliefs, instead, concept abolitionists can make use of alternative utterances and attitudes that share salient characteristics with moral claims and beliefs, allowing for a kind of theorizing that is practically oriented, impartial, involves the traditional subject matters and methods of normative ethics, and allows engagement with the arguments of traditional moral philosophers.
Dissertation
Living Without Normativity
Many philosophers think that morality possesses a particularly robust kind of normativity that other systems of norms, such as etiquette or the rules of chess, lack. My dissertation addresses, first, what exactly theorists suppose this robust normativity comes down to and, second, the implications for our practical lives if morality ultimately isn’t robustly normative–indeed, if no system of norms is. Regarding the first issue, I argue that, while reductive accounts of robust normativity fail, we can get a grasp on the notion of robust normativity through the use of metaphors. Regarding the second issue, I argue that we can live without robust normativity insofar as many of our motivations are likely to “survive” a belief in antirealism about robust normativity; in the absence of robust reasons and values, we can let ourselves be guided by our motivations.
Publications
"Nonnaturalism and the Ineffability of Moral Normativity", Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming)
Metaethical nonnaturalists claim that rival theories fail to capture the special kind of normativity that morality seems to possess. Yet, they struggle to articulate an account of moral normativity that makes clear what the naturalist is missing. While some philosophers take this struggle to show that the nonnaturalist’s notion of normativity is illusory, I argue that a more benign explanation is available that fits well with the general tenor of nonnaturalism and that explains a number of puzzling observations about the state of the metaethical debate. This explanation is that morality’s normativity is ineffable. I also argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, my strategy for redeeming the nonnaturalist does not commit her to the quietist view that nothing sensible can be said about moral normativity. While the ineffability of moral normativity precludes an informative literal characterization, there remains the possibility of using metaphors to communicate usefully about moral normativity.
"The Inefficacy Objection and New Ethical Veganism" Journal of Social Philosophy (2023, online first)
Traditionally, both proponents and detractors have understood ethical veganism as the position that veganism is obligatory and that eating meat is wrong. One of the most forceful objections recently raised against ethical veganism is the inefficacy objection, which says that no individual’s choice to be vegan can be expected to impact the meat industry. I argue that, in light of the inefficacy objection and subsequent responses, we should take seriously a more modest brand of ethical veganism, which I call “new ethical veganism.” New ethical veganism is non-committal as to whether being vegan is obligatory but maintains that, either way, it is morally good. I offer four theoretical interpretations of the claim that it is good to be vegan and argue that some of the most prominent responses to the inefficacy objection lend themselves better to a defense of new ethical veganism than traditional ethical veganism.
"The Paradox of Rape in Horror Movies" British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2022): 671-86 (download self-archived version)
In this paper, I identify and provide an explanation for a heretofore unrecognized puzzle in feminist aesthetics and the philosophy of horror. Many horror movie fans have an aversion to rape scenes. This is puzzling because genre fans are not equally bothered by the depiction of other types of violence and cruelty. I argue that we can make sense of this selective aversion by appeal to the notion of “distance,” which philosophers of horror use to explain why people are attracted to horror movies in the first place. When we consume horror, we “distance” ourselves from the scary things depicted, which allows other mechanisms to kick in that lead to overall enjoyment. I argue that “distance” often collapses when viewers are confronted with depictions of rape because rape is common in real life and a gendered form of violence that is implicated in social injustice.
"Species Egalitarianism and Respect for Nature: Of Mice and Carrots" in Oliver Sensen and Richard Dean (eds.), Respect: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press (2021)
I urge a reconsideration of the implications of species egalitarianism, which is an essential element of the position in environmental ethics that Paul Taylor calls “respect for nature.” Species egalitarianism’s claim that every living thing has equal inherent worth appears to lead to counterintuitive conclusions, such as that killing a human being is no worse than killing a dandelion. Species egalitarians have generally responded by explaining that species egalitarianism is compatible with recognizing moral differences between killing different types of living things, and that some killing is morally permissible. I raise doubts about whether this deflationary defensive strategy is philosophically justified, and suggests that taking seriously the supposedly repugnant implications of species egalitarianism may have a salutary effect on the overall debate.
"Error Theory and Abolitionist Ethics" The Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2020): 431-55 (download self-archived version)
Here is a prima facie plausible view: since the metaethical error theory says that all positive moral claims are false, it makes no sense for error theorists to engage in normative ethics. After all, normative ethics tries to identify what is right or wrong (and why), but the error theory implies that nothing is ever right or wrong. One way for error theorists to push back is to argue for “concept preservationism,” that is, the view that even though our ordinary moral discourse is deeply flawed, we should nevertheless continue to engage in moral thought and talk. However, in this article, I pursue a different strategy. I argue that even if we completely abandon moral discourse, thus endorsing “concept abolitionism,” the discipline of normative ethics survives. While traditional normative ethics uses as its “starting points” moral claims and beliefs, instead, concept abolitionists can make use of alternative utterances and attitudes that share salient characteristics with moral claims and beliefs, allowing for a kind of theorizing that is practically oriented, impartial, involves the traditional subject matters and methods of normative ethics, and allows engagement with the arguments of traditional moral philosophers.
Dissertation
Living Without Normativity
Many philosophers think that morality possesses a particularly robust kind of normativity that other systems of norms, such as etiquette or the rules of chess, lack. My dissertation addresses, first, what exactly theorists suppose this robust normativity comes down to and, second, the implications for our practical lives if morality ultimately isn’t robustly normative–indeed, if no system of norms is. Regarding the first issue, I argue that, while reductive accounts of robust normativity fail, we can get a grasp on the notion of robust normativity through the use of metaphors. Regarding the second issue, I argue that we can live without robust normativity insofar as many of our motivations are likely to “survive” a belief in antirealism about robust normativity; in the absence of robust reasons and values, we can let ourselves be guided by our motivations.